Paris Soir - US Midterm Results Expose Vulnerabilities in Gulf Security Architecture

The aftermath of the Democratic sweep in the 2026 US midterm elections has exposed significant vulnerabilities in the security architecture that Gulf states have constructed around Washington over the past year. While European ministers, Iran’s parliament speaker, and South Africa’s president issued immediate statements regarding the political shift, governments across the Gulf remained conspicuously silent. This silence was interpreted by analysts as a more telling signal than market reactions; Qatar’s benchmark index rose 2.3 percent on Wednesday morning, driven by hopes that a Democratic-controlled Congress would exercise greater restraint in its approach to Iran.

The core of the anxiety lies in the legal foundation of current US-Gulf security ties. Over the last twelve months, Gulf nations have built their defense strategies on instruments that depend almost entirely on the signature of a single executive, bypassing traditional legislative oversight. The most prominent example is Qatar’s security guarantee. Following Israeli strikes on Doha in September 2025, President Donald Trump signed an executive order declaring it US policy to guarantee the security and territorial integrity of Qatar against external attack. While this commitment exceeded previous American promises to a state that already hosts the largest US air base in the region, it was never submitted to the Senate for ratification and lacks the binding force of a formal defense treaty.

Saudi Arabia pursued a similar path with even greater strategic implications. During Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to Washington in November 2025, Trump designated the kingdom a major non-NATO ally and announced a Strategic Defense Agreement. This pact covered the sale of F-35 fighter jets, approximately 300 tanks, and broader industrial cooperation. At the time, analysts at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy noted that while the agreement appeared more formal than Qatar’s executive order, it rested on the same precarious foundation: it was an executive agreement rather than a ratified treaty, meaning the Senate would not ratify it.

The flow of weapons has followed this same trajectory of minimizing congressional involvement. In May, as Iranian missiles and drones struck across the region, the administration invoked emergency powers to bypass congressional review of $8.6 billion in sales to Middle Eastern partners. This package included $4.01 billion for Patriot missile replenishment for Qatar and a $2.5 billion air-defense command system for Kuwait. By September, the State Department approved the sale of 48 F-35s to Saudi Arabia for $24.3 billion. Although this sale requires formal notification and a 30-day congressional review period, it remains subject to political volatility.

Senator Jeanne Shaheen, a long-standing critic of Riyadh, had already demanded that the administration explain how these jets would preserve Israel’s military edge, highlighting the growing scrutiny over arms transfers. The broader implication is that nearly every pillar of the Gulf’s American security relationship in 2026 was constructed to minimize Congress’s role. This strategy functioned effectively while a Republican-controlled Congress was willing to overlook executive bypasses, but it becomes increasingly untenable under Democratic leadership.

While it is easy to exaggerate the immediate danger, the structural risks are real. Congress cannot revoke an executive order or cancel an executive agreement through simple legislation. It can pass a joint resolution of disapproval against arms sales, but President Trump retains veto power, and overriding that veto requires a two-thirds majority in both chambers. Gulf states have witnessed this dynamic before; in 2019, after Trump used emergency declarations to push arms sales to Saudi Arabia, both chambers voted to block them, Trump vetoed the resolutions, and the Senate failed to override him, resulting in the delivery of the weapons.

However, the real risk lies in two specific areas: friction and time. The first is procedural friction. A Democratic majority controls committee hearings, informal holds on arms notifications, and the war supplemental funding that determines how quickly American interceptor stocks are rebuilt. Every Gulf sale from January onward will arrive in a chamber that regards the Iran conflict as unauthorized and has already observed the administration skip its review processes once. Delay, rather than outright denial, is the more likely outcome, but for states absorbing Iranian fire, such delays carry significant costs.

The second risk is temporal. An executive order can be revoked with a single signature, and January 2029 is only 26 months away. The midterm results serve as a preview of a presidential contest that Gulf capitals cannot influence and which may produce an administration with fundamentally different views on the Iran war, F-35 sales, and the personal diplomacy that facilitated them. A guarantee granted by one president via decree can be withdrawn by another.

The obvious temptation for Gulf capitals is to hedge their bets by deepening defense-industrial ties with partners in Asia and Europe. While some diversification is sensible, no other supplier can currently replace American interceptors, aircraft, and early-warning networks in the midst of a conflict with Iran. Therefore, the more prudent course is not to drift away from Washington but to widen the Gulf’s base of support within the US government.

For years, Gulf diplomacy in the United States has been an executive-branch affair, conducted through envoys, investment pledges, and direct lines to the White House. The new Congress will reward a different approach: regular engagement with committee chairs, transparency regarding how American weapons are used in the Iran war, and support for converting at least part of the current architecture into legislation that Congress votes on. A defense commitment that passes through the Senate is harder to secure but also much more difficult for a future president to undo.

The first indication of whether Gulf leaders have understood this message will be visible before January 3. If Gulf defense and foreign ministers begin appearing on Capitol Hill, not just at the White House, it will signal recognition that the American pen they have relied upon now has a second holder. If they do not, they may discover in 2029 how quickly a guarantee written by decree can be unwritten.

X.Francois--PS