Paris Soir - Why China props up Putin

Beijing’s refusal to condemn Moscow’s full-scale assault on Ukraine has hardened into active, if carefully calibrated, material support. Customs and corporate-registration data show Chinese firms now dominate the flow of critical metals, micro-electronics and dual-use components that keep Russia’s defence industry alive, even as Western sanctions tighten.

Recent investigative dossiers detail how small export-intermediaries in coastal provinces label drone engines as “industrial refrigeration units,” allowing them to cross Eurasia by rail and re-appear inside Shahed-style loitering munitions launched against Odesa and Kyiv.

The trade underpinning this pipeline is immense. Despite a 9 % year-on-year dip, bilateral turnover still exceeded $106 billion in the first half of 2025, with Chinese car parts, machine tools and consumer electronics filling gaps left by departing Western brands. Energy sits at the core of the partnership. Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin agreed in May to fast-track the 50 bcm-per-year “Power of Siberia 2” gas link, which would lock in discounted Siberian gas for decades and give Moscow a lifeline as European demand evaporates.

Financial ties deepen in parallel. By late 2024 more than a third of Russia’s trade was settled in yuan, helping the Kremlin skirt dollar clearing and accelerating Beijing’s long-term bid to internationalise its currency. Yet 98 % of Chinese banks now refuse direct rouble deals, a sign of how carefully Beijing manages sanctions exposure. Strategically, Chinese planners see virtue in a protracted conflict that drains U.S. and European arsenals, diverts NATO bandwidth, and tests Western sanctions architecture—all while avoiding outright Russian collapse that could leave a NATO-leaning vacuum on China’s northern frontier.

Washington and Brussels are responding. The EU is preparing its first penalties on Chinese banks accused of laundering Russian transactions, while Kyiv has black-listed several mainland suppliers implicated in drone production.

Still, Beijing judges the benefits—energy security, discounted commodities, a pliant strategic partner, and valuable combat data for its own doctrine—outweigh the risks. The partnership remains officially “no-limits,” but in practice it is bounded by one overriding calculation: help Moscow enough to bleed Ukraine and frustrate the West, yet not so openly that secondary sanctions threaten China’s wider economic ambitions.